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 The exceptions only serve to tantalize one with the potentiali-
 ties inherent in the study of individual judicial cases (and, one
 would hope, eventual comparative analysis). Both works are or-
 ganized along the same lines. The narratives take one from the
 genesis of the struggle to its conclusion, and along the way first
 relate the facts and events essential to the determination of the
 causes, then structure and interpret the lawyers' arguments and
 the judicial opinions, and finally examine the ultimate impact of
 the decisions. Stites though seems satisfied merely to let the events
 unfold while only occasionally offering an insight into what really
 might be at stake, while Kutler's chapters are rich with analysis
 in addition to recounting the tale carefully. In short, Kutler
 brings to the writing of American constitutional history some of
 the methods, techniques, and perspectives that Willard Hurst in-
 troduced to the writing of American legal history. And the fresh
 approach stands in sharp contrast to Stites's traditional reliance
 on narrative and his dogged attempt to rationalize doctrinal in-
 consistencies that just might be almost inexplicable.
 The contrast in substance is once again highlighted by an ap-
 parent congruence in form. Kutler titled his work "Privilege and
 Creative Destruction" and effectively integrated these ideas into
 his discussion of the case. Stites's title invokes "Private Interest
 and Public Gain"-a striking parallel, one might add (perhaps
 unkindly), to Kutler's earlier formulation. If we equate "Privilege"
 with "Private Interest" and "Creative Destruction" with "Public
 Gain" (in the latter case, as one suspects Chief Justice Taney
 would have), we would be presented with an ideal opportunity
 (based on what the titles announce) to indulge in comparative
 analysis of the cases for ourselves. Unfortunately, we are left to
 conjecture as well as to analyze, for while Kutler delivers as prom-
 ised, Stites never really tells us what his statement of "Private
 Interest and Public Gain" in relation to the Dartmouth College
 case means.
 All this is not to say that Stites has not done a competent job
 within the limits and framework he chose. It is only to question
 those limits, and to suggest that Kutler's attempt to examine "the
 law's functional context and the interrelationship between law
 and society, rather than merely the abstract, embryonic growth
 of particular doctrines" is a more valuable and useful historical
 approach. Stites's examination is workmanlike and shows impres-
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 sive evidence of having been thoroughly researched. Some might
 argue too well-researched-offering a ratio of text to footnotes of
 113 pages to 44 pages. (One sometimes gets the feeling that Stites's
 citations, though not presenting one with information one ought
 not to know, borders on supplying one with information one
 might not need to know.) As a result, a conscientious attempt to
 follow the footnotes often severely interrupts the reading, and
 what once might be termed copious and complete documentation
 deteriorates into a cumbersome device. Nothing is excluded, but
 unfortunately Stites draws too few conclusions from his mass of
 arrayed sources. The Dartmouth College case (with the possible
 exception of the Dred Scott case) is probably the most discussed,
 cited, and written about case in antebellum America. It is not
 clear that all we need at this juncture is simply a more complete
 version of the story. In contrast, Kutler has essentially eschewed
 footnotes and documentation. The uninitiated occasionally might
 suffer under this scheme, and even the expert familiar with the
 sources might wonder where some of Kutler's quotations may be
 found. (Kutler's hints in his bibliographical essay may not prove
 enough.) But Kutler's plan in presenting an unimpeded render-
 ing of the case, with its attendant analysis, ultimately justifies it-
 self. While I would not recommend Kutler's style for broader
 studies, his choice of format certainly does not detract from his
 effective argument.
 In fairness to Stites, it may not be possible to produce the type
 of substantive analysis and draw the kinds of conclusions about
 the Dartmouth College case that Kutler did with the Charles River
 Bridge case. As Kutler notes, the Charles River Bridge case was
 "a landmark involving the interrelationship of public policy,
 technological change, capital developments, competition, and
 law." Its impact on the economic development of the United
 States is a matter for empirical proof. Occurring at a time when
 railroads were vying to replace turnpikes and canals as the most
 efficient means of transportation and communication, the Supreme
 Court's decision inserted a measure of order into a situation that
 threatened chaos. A conflict between an old established toll bridge
 on the verge of being sacrificed to a newly chartered free bridge,
 one located near the other, was easily translatable into a broader
 context. But what of a direct legislative alteration of a corporate
 charter that evolved from a series of disputes between a cantanker-
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 ous college president and a body of less than submissive trustees.
 Is the Dartmouth College case so different from the Charles River
 Bridge case as to lend itself to a totally different mode of analysis?
 Could Stites have asked some of the same questions Kutler did?
 Probably so.
 Instead of spending so much time attempting to preserve doc-
 trinal symmetry and seeking to unravel the mysteries of the con-
 tract clause as so many have valiantly sought to before him, Stites
 could have asked some potentially revealing questions. Did the
 Dartmouth College case holding actually serve to encourage in-
 fant business as has been so often suggested in the past? What was
 the real effect in the competitive marketplace of the supposed
 sanctity of corporate charters? Did legislatively imposed reserva-
 tion clauses in charters effectively limit corporate power and
 "vested rights" in advance of the Charles River Bridge holding?
 Was the state's ability to plan or initiate action at all hindered by
 the Dartmouth College case? What impact did the public/private
 dichotomy have on the development of legal principles in the
 subsequent thirty years? Of course, there are many other interest-
 ing questions that need answering. But the few suggested above
 might have lifted Stites's work out of the conventional presenta-
 tion of the case.
 American constitutional historiography seems to be in a period
 of narrowing interests. Broader themes are ignored, or when
 tackled invariably extrapolated out of relatively limited and con-
 fined cases, periods, and even constitutional clauses. It can cer-
 tainly be argued that all such scholarship is merely providing the
 foundation for more general work to follow. But the descent into
 particularity has not yielded much yet in the way of broader
 studies. A history of the United States Supreme Court is underway
 now that is divided into arbitrary periods governed essentially by
 the appointment and death of various chief justices. Its results may
 lead one eventually to conclude that the whole is after all not
 always equal to the sum of all its parts. In the cases of Stites and
 Kutler, we are faced with a striking example of the disparate re-
 sults a relatively narrow focus can yield. Perhaps the solution is as
 simple as stating that Kutler asked the better questions.
 ALFRED S. KONEFSKY.
